An algorithm for − 1-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in a ring with rational agents was proposed by Afek et al. [1] . A proof of impossibility of − 1-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in every topology with rational agents, when is even, is presented. Furthermore, we show that the only algorithm which can solve the problem when is odd is the one proposed in [1] . Finally, we prove that the proposed algorithm provides a − 2-strong-equillibrium in a synchronous ring when is even.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of distributed consensus, where processors, some of which may be faulty, have to agree on the same value which is also an input to one of them, has been well studied [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . More recently, there is growing interest in the model of distributed computing with rational agents which may deviate from a distributed algorithm in order to affect the result of the algorithm [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
The main concern regarding distributed computation with rational agents is to provide an algorithm which is resilient to rational agents, meaning that rational agents would gain nothing by deviating from the protocol. In order to address this more formally, Afek et al. use the following definitions (refer to [1] for full details): Definition 1 (Utility Function). Let be a distributed algorithm, and be the set of all possible final states of . Let be an agent, then : → ℝ is the utility function, such that ∀ ∈ , ( ) is the profit would gain from reaching the final state .
Definition 2 (Solution Preference). Let be a distributed algorithm, and be the set of all possible final states of . Let be an agent, and be its utility function, then satisfy the solution preference iff ∀ , ∈ such that is a legal final state of and is an erroneous final state of , ( ) ≥ ( ). Definition 3 (K-Strong-Equilibrium). Let be a distributed algorithm, and the set of processors, then reaches kstrong equilibrium iff ∀ ⊆ , such that | | ≤ , for every ∈ the following holds:
[
| ] ≤ [ | ]
The problem of distributed consensus with rational agents is addressed in [1] and in [2] . In the model proposed in [1] , some processors may prefer a certain outcome of the protocol, i.e. that all processors eventually agree on the value 1 or that all agree on the value 0.
Afek et al. propose in [1] an algorithm providing a − 1-strong-equilibrium for the problem of distributed consensus with rational agents in a synchronous ring. The algorithm is presented in IV.
In this paper we show that this algorithm fails in case is even. Moreover, we show that a − 1-strong-equilibrium is unattainable when is even, in every topology (II). Nonetheless, we prove that it is the only algorithm that provides a − 1-strong-equilibrium in a synchronous ring, when is odd (III), and that the algorithm does provide a − 2-strong-equilibrium in a synchronous ring (IV). Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is an algorithm that provides a − 1-strong-equillibrium. Given a coalition of size − 1, denote the single node which is not part of this coalition by , and the group of nodes in the coalition (i.e. /{ }) by .
II. IMPOSSIBILITY OF − 1-STRONG-EQUILIBRIUM WHEN IS EVEN

Definition 4 (Input Cheaters
We will show that even when we bound to be input cheaters, will fail to provide a − 1-strong-equillibrium. We will use the following notations: 1.
( ) -The value decided by a node when it finishes to run . Proof. We will prove the lemma by backwards induction on ( ). If ( ) = − 1, then ( ) = 1. If ( ) = 1 then using (1) we conclude ( ) = 1, and indeed 1 = ¬(1 ⊕ 1). Otherwise, ( ) = 0. Assume that ( ) = (0, … ,0) and that ∀ ∈ : (0) = 0, (1) = 1 i.e. every player in prefers that ( ) = 1.
If did not cheat, their expected utilization was:
Where = 1 is a result of (2). On the other hand, if cheated with ( ) = − 1 , i.e. = (1) , then their expected utilization was:
Since provides a − 1-strong-equillibrium then should not benefit from cheating. Formally,
Combining (3), (4) and (5) we have
We will assume the statements hold for ( ) = and prove it for ( ) = − 1. Consider the first case ( ) = 0, i.e. 2 = 1. If ( ) = 1 then consider a node ∈ such that ( ) = 0 (there must be such because ( ) < − 1). Note that since are input cheaters, is in the same situation as is in case ( ) = 0 and ( ) = , except that is in the coalition and is not. Of course, cannot know this, therefore applying the induction hypothesis where ( ) = and ( ) = 0, may locally deduce that ( ) = 0. Using agreement property of consensus, we have ( ) = 0. Indeed 0 = ¬(1 ⊕ 0). If ( ) = 0 then we can assume that ( ) = (1) and that ∀ ∈ : (0) = 1, (1) = 0 i.e. every player in prefers that ( ) = 0. If did not cheat, their expected utilization was:
≤ ℙ( ( ) = 0) = 1 2 Where = 1 is a result of (1). Notice that from the case ( ) = 1 above, ℙ( ( ) = 0| ( ) = , ( ) = 1) = 1 follows. Therefore, if did cheat, the expected utilization of was:
The second case ( ) = 1, is symmetric. ∎ In case ( ) = 0 and ( ) = 0, by Lemma 1.1 we have that ( ) = ¬(0 ⊕ 0) = 1, contradicting (2) . ∎
III. SINGULARITY OF THE SOLUTION ALGORITHM WHEN IS ODD
Assume is an algorithm providing a − 1-strong-equilibrium when is odd. We can repeat the proof of Lemma 1.1, replacing the claim with ( ) = ( ) ⊕ ( ).
The proof works exactly the same, but the result of this lemma doesn't contradict (2).
Instead, we have that even number of nodes with an input equal to 1 results in ( ) = 0 and odd number of nodes with an input equal to 1 results in ( ) = 1. Thus, if we look at as a function that maps between the nodes' inputs and the output of the distributed consensus, is exactly equal to the algorithm given in [1] .
IV. A − 2-STRONG-EQULLIBRIUM
Theorem 2 (A − 2-Strong-Equilibrium Algorithm) Assuming uniform distribution over the inputs and a synchronous ring of even size, the algorithm proposed in [1] works and provides a − 2-strong-equilibrium.
Proof. To simplify, we shall start by assuming the ring is unidirectional. A method to discard this assumption regardless of the cheating coalition is shown in [2] .
We shall present the algorithm proposed in [1] : 
Proof. Addressing validity -if every node got 0 as an input, then for every node in the ring . _ will be 0, meaning that . _ 2 = 0 resulting in all nodes agreeing on 0. If every node got 1 as input, then for every node in the ring . _ will be + 1, and since is even -it will result in 1 as consensus. If some nodes got 0 and others got 1, every outcome is acceptable in terms of validity.
Addressing agreement -if all nodes comply then every node after line 18 will have the exact same values for _ , _ and _ (follows from a simple induction), which will result in all nodes agreeing on the same value.
-we shall prove the following claims by induction on the number of nodes: If = 2 (we shall denote the nodes as 1 , 2 ): Addressing the first claim -there are 4 possible inputs that can be given to the nodes -<0,0> , <0,1> , <1,0> , <1,1>. In half of them the sum of all inputs is even, in the other half -odd.
Addressing the second claim -if 1 and 2 both got 0 as an input -the sum (including the leader) is even. If both got 1 -the sum (including the leader) is odd. If 1 got 0 and 2 got 1 -then if 1 is elected leader they will decide on 1, else they will decide on 0. The exact opposite result will occur if 1 got 1 and 2 got 0. In conclusion -in exactly half of the cases the sum (including leader) is even, and in the other half -odd. Now, assume the above claims applies to all rings of size = 2( − 1). We shall prove it applies to a ring of size = 2 . Addressing claim 1 -By applying the same analysis done in the base case for nodes 2 , 2 −1 and by using the induction hypothesis, the claim is proven.
Addressing claim 2 -Denote the nodes as 1 , 2 , … 2 . If 2 and 2 −1 aren't elected as leader, then their contribution to _ is odd (exactly 1) half of the times and even (0 or 2) the other half. By induction hypothesis (claim 2) , we know that if one of the nodes 1 , 2 , … 2 −2 was elected leader, then in half of the cases their sum of inputs (including leader) is 0, and in the other half -it is 1. Thus the contribution of 2 −1 , 2 maintains the probability of 0 or 1 to be decided.
If 2 or 2 −1 are elected as leader, then by applying claim 1 on 1 , 2 , … 2 −2 and claim 2 on 2 −1 , 2 , the claim is proven. = . Note that and may or may not be the actual values with which was initialized in the beginning. Furthermore, the id may or may not be an id of an actual node in the ring.
Let ∈ , ∉ such that is the closest member of the coalition to from 's _ . Also, let be the number of nodes between and , including u. It is clear that (as a member of the coalition) may lie regarding − of the triplets sent to (thus, giving the coalition control over − messages) but cannot affect of the triplets received by ( ( ) and the triplets of the − 1 nodes between and ). Further, receives these triplets after it had sent all − triplets controlled by him. Of course, cannot change the triplets it sends after it had sent them, which implies that any information that received from is independent of any information that received from . In order to reflect this conclusion, we define the following:
1.
( , ) -the set of nodes between and , including . 2.
( ) = { ( , )| ∉ ( , )}. These triplets are fully controlled by . 3.
ℎ( ) = { ( , )| ∈ ( , )}. These aren't controlled by C. 4.
( ) = ∑ .
Lemma 2.2 Given a coalition of cheaters denoted , and a node ∉ , then every id in .
_ has the same probability of 1 to be elected as leader by , regardless of the actions taken by .
Proof. This lemma has been explored and proved in [1] , [2] . In short -( ) ∈ ℎ( ) ≠ which means that ( ) is uniformly distributed. Since . _ includes ( ) in the sum, . _ is uniformly distributed as well, which means that every value between 0 to − 1 has an equal chance to be selected as an index to . _ . ∎
Lemma 2.3 Given a coalition of cheaters denoted , and a node ∉ , if the leader elected by is
Proof. From the algorithm, after line 22 we have:
Since we have assumed a uniform distribution over the inputs, the probability that ( ) is odd is equal to the probability that it is even, i.e. . This implies that _ has the same probability to be odd and even, regardless of the parity of ( ) + ( . , ). This proves Lemma 2.3. ∎ It follows from 2.3 and 2.4 that:
Lemma 2.4 Assume a coalition of cheaters denoted , and a node
Combining (1), (2) and (3): (4) ℙ( 1 .
The exact same result applies to 2 . As we explained, in this case 1 . is independent of 2 . , therefore the probability for a consensus to be reached over 1 is: (5) ℙ ( Where ≤ 1 is a result of ≥ 4 (there are 2 non cheaters and an even non-zero number of coalition members). Therefore has no incentive to cheat in Case 1.
Case 2:
The and values received by 1 and 2 during the course of the algorithm are identical, but the values are different. In this case, the leader elected by 1 is the same as the one elected by 2 . For convenience, we shall denote it as , since both nodes choose the same leader in this case. By Lemma 2.2:
From Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we have:
By combining (6) -(9), we can derive: Thus has no incentive to cheat in Case 2 as well.
Case 3: Nodes 1 and 2 receive the exact same triplets during the course of the algorithm. In this case at least one of the nodes will not choose itself as the leader. By Lemma 2.3 the probability of this node deciding on 1 is 1 2 , and this bounds the probability of a consensus over this value. Hence, has no incentive to cheat . From Lemmas 2.5 and 2.7 we know that regardless of the position of the two non-cheaters (neighbors or not) there is no incentive for cheaters to cheat. Thus, the algorithm provides a − 2-strong-equilibrium. ∎
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proved that problem of distributed consensus with a coalition of − 1 rational agents cannot be solved when is even, regardless of the network topology. Furthermore, we have proved that when is odd, there can be only one method to reach consensus -the parity of the sum of all inputs.
Also, we have proved that the algorithm from [1] solves the problem of distributed consensus in a synchronous ring with a coalition of − 2 rational agents, when is even. Thus, we gave both an upper and a lower bound on the maximal size of a coalition supported by a correct protocol for the problem of distributed consensus with rational agents in this topology.
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